A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper, we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in …xed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.
Introduction
In a seminal paper Vega-Redondo (1997) shows how imitation of successful behavior can push agents towards very competitive outcomes. Speci…cally, he shows that in Cournot games imitation of the most successful strategies leads in the long run to the Walrasian outcome where price is equal to marginal cost. 1 This result is important since Cournot games not only serve as the main workhorse model for industrial organization but re ‡ect, more generally, environments where there is a tension between cooperation and competition, with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome somewhere in between perfect collusion and perfect competition.
Two experimental papers (Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 1999 and Offerman, Potters, and Sonnemans, 2002) con…rm the behavioral relevance of Vega-Redondo's (1997) …ndings. When experimental subjects have access to information that allows them to imitate their rivals, competition gets signi…cantly more intense. This is true even when subjects have all the necessary information to play the Nash equilibrium. In fact, both papers show that while subjects converge to Cournot-Nash if they have just the necessary information to play a best reply, additional information about rivals' choices and performance-which orthodox game theory deems irrelevantleads them away from equilibrium play towards more competitive outcomes. 2 In this paper we re-examine both, Vega-Redondo's (1997) theoretical result and the experimental …ndings on it. First, we show that Vega-Redondo's theoretical result is surprisingly fragile. Slightest di¤erences in costs are shown to have a huge impact on the long-run behavior of agents. 3 Specifically, we show that for an arbitrarily small change in some agent's …xed costs, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run if the grid size of the action set is small enough. The intuition for this is simple. If a …rm with a slight …xed cost advantage moves to a slightly di¤erent quantity, it will, due to its cost advantage, still be the most successful …rm and will thus be copied by others.
We also show that this theoretical result is not only a curiosity that occurs in the limit. Rather we …nd in a series of simulations that small di¤erences in agents'costs have large e¤ects on their pro…ts if they imitate most of the time but experiment with a reasonable frequency. Speci…cally, we report that when one …rm has a slight cost advantage, industry pro…ts rise by more than 35% for experimentation rates of 10% or 20%.
Second, we conduct new experiments to analyze whether such cost di¤er-entials also change behavior of subjects in the laboratory. Our …ndings are very clear-cut. Despite implementing a non-trivial cost di¤erential, we …nd no change in outcomes. When subjects can observe their rivals, outcomes are far more competitive than predicted by the Cournot-Nash equilibrium regardless of whether there are di¤erences in costs or not. This con…rms the strong behavioral link between feedback about rivals ("market transparency") and competitive behavior.
Theoretical predictions
As in Vega-Redondo's (1997) model, we consider a market for an homogeneous good where a set of …rms N = f1; :::; ng is competing á la Cournot. Each …rm i produces some quantity q i . The vector of quantities by …rms other than i is denoted by q i : In line with the prior literature, we assume for technical reasons that …rms choose their output from a common grid = f0; ; 2 ; :::; v g with > 0 and 2 N. The total quantity Q = P n i=1 q i produced by all …rms determines the price on the market via a linear inverse demand function p(Q) = maxfa bQ; 0g. We assume that all …rms face constant marginal costs c with 0 c < a. In addition, we assume that …rm i may have to bear some …xed cost (or bonus) f i . So …rm i's cost function is given by c i (q i ) = cq i + f i . The …xed costs may di¤er among …rms. Pro…ts of …rm i are given by
The (symmetric) Walrasian quantity q w is de…ned as the quantity at which price equals marginal cost c when all …rms produce the same quantity. Within our setup we have q w = a c bn :
We assume that q w 2 , i.e. the Walrasian quantity is contained in the quantity grid.
After each period t = 1; 2; ::: each …rm observes the quantities produced and the pro…ts associated with these quantities of all …rms in the market. It then chooses the quantity that yielded the highest pro…t in the previous period. That is, we are considering an imitate the best max rule. 4 More formally, in period t …rm i chooses q Ties are assumed to be broken randomly. In addition, with small probability " > 0 each …rm ignores the action prescribed by the imitation rule and chooses an action at random from all actions in . Let ! q denote the monomorphic state in which all players set the same quantity q.
The adjustment process described above gives rise to a Markov process. We use methods developed by Freidlin and Wentzel (1984) (…rst applied in an economic context by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob, 1993; Nöldeke and Samuelson, 1993; and Young, 1993) to identify the set of stochastically stable states, i.e. states that are in the support of the limit invariant distribution as the mutation probability " goes to zero.
Let us now assume that some …rm k has a cost advantage over all other …rms in the market. We model this cost advantage via the …xed cost. In particular and without loss of generality, we assume that f i = 0 for all i 6 = k and f k = g 0.
Note that if g = 0, i.e. all …rms have identical cost functions, a single mutation towards the Walrasian quantity q w is always imitated by other …rms. The simple reason for this is that if price exceeds marginal cost, the …rm with the highest quantity makes the largest pro…t and will be imitated. If prices are below marginal costs, the …rm with the lowest quantity makes the smallest loss and hence will be imitated. Hence, as shown by VegaRedondo (1997), with identical cost functions only the state in which all …rms set the Walrasian quantity is stochastically stable.
If however …rm k has a cost advantage, it may be the case that after a mutation of …rm k away from the Walrasian quantity it still earns the highest pro…t and hence will be imitated. Other …rms, of course, do not realize that this higher pro…t is due to the lower …xed cost. They simply observe that the strategy choice of …rm k was more successful. This introduces another source of bounded rationality which pushes the system away from the Walrasian quantity.
Proposition 1 (1) If there are no di¤ erences in …xed cost (g = 0), then the Walrasian state ! q w is the unique stochastically stable state.
(2) For any di¤ erence in …xed costs g > 0; there exists a grid size such that for all < , the set of stochastically stable states is given by the set of all monomorphic states on the grid, f! q jq 2 g.
Proof. The …rst part follows without modi…cation from Vega-Redondo (1997).
With respect to the second part, note that as in Vega-Redondo's model, under the imitate the best rule only monomorphic states are absorbing. Consider any non-monomorphic state !. Assume that …rms make di¤erent pro…ts and say …rm j makes the highest pro…ts. With positive probability all …rms will imitate …rm j and we reach the state ! q j . Note that there is also the (non-generic) case that …rm k and …rms i 6 = k make the same pro…ts but o¤er di¤erent quantities. However, since ties are broken randomly, with positive probability the dynamics will shift us to the state ! q j .
We now identify the set of stochastically stable states for arbitrary g and . Consider some monomorphic state ! q and assume that …rm k mutates and decreases its quantity by the smallest possible unit, i.e. …rm k mutates to q k . This (downward) mutation will be followed if …rm k's pro…ts after the mutation exceeds the pro…ts of the other …rms, i.e. if and only if
So, a single downward mutation is followed if
Note that this implies that the lowest quantity that can be reached by a chain of single downward mutations is q low . Obviously, from all q > q w , a downward move is always possible, just as in Vega-Redondo (1997). But for g > 0, downward moves become possible for some q < q w as well.
Likewise, note that a single upward mutation q k + of …rm k is followed if
as long as p > 0. Again, we can move up to q high + by a chain of single mutations. Consider now the case p = 0, i.e., q a bn . An upward mutation is followed if c(q + ) + g cq: That is if
Note that if q high + a bn , inequality (4) holds also. That is, if we can move up to the point where the price is zero, we can move up all the way to the upper bound of our grid. Figure 1 summarizes the results so far. All one-step mutations toward q w are always possible. Downward movements for q < q w are possible if and only if (1) is satis…ed. Upwards movements for q w < q < Hence, all states in B form one large "mutation connected component", which is stochastically stable (see Nöldeke and Samuelson, 1993) . Note that as ! 0 the set B converges to the set f! q jq 2 g.
Experimental design
In our experiment, subjects played repeated 3-player Cournot games in …xed groups for 60 periods. The payo¤ function for each round was given by
with p(Q) = maxf120 Q; 0g being the inverse demand function. Marginal cost were set to 0. The grid of quantities was given by = f20; 21; 21:5; :::; 39:5; 40g: 5 Note that the symmetric joint pro…t maximizing output is at q c = 20, the Cournot Nash equilibrium output is at q N = 30, and the symmetric Walrasian output is at q w = 40.
In order to make imitation salient and give the theoretical results the best shot, subjects were not told anything about the game's payo¤ function apart from the fact that their payo¤ deterministically depended on their own choice and the choices of the two other subjects in their group, and that the payo¤ function was the same throughout all of the experiment. After each period, subjects learned their own payo¤, and the actions and payo¤s of the two other subjects in their group. The 40 actions in were labeled as 1; 2; :::; 40 in ascending order.
We ran two treatments, one symmetric and one asymmetric, that di¤ered only in the value of the f i 's. In Treatment SYM, there were no …xed costs, f i = 0 for all i. In Treatment ASYM, however, there was a …xed bonus for …rm 3, g = f 3 = 50; while f i = 0 for i = 1; 2: This amounts to the same as having a …xed cost of 50 for …rms 1 and 2 but has the advantage of avoiding losses for subjects, which are di¢ cult to enforce in an experiment. Subjects were not informed about di¤erences in …xed cost in ASYM although they might have noticed them when all subjects in a group chose the same or similar actions but realized di¤erent payo¤s.
The computerized experiments 6 were run in the ELSE laboratory at UCL. We had 7 independent groups in SYM and 8 in ASYM. In total 45 subjects participated in the experiment, drawn from the student population at UCL. 7 Subjects were paid a show-up fee of £ 5 and in addition to this were given £ 0.005 per point won during the experiment. The average payment was around £ 11 per subject, including the show-up fee. All sessions lasted less than 60 minutes.
Given this setup we can derive the following theoretical hypothesis from Proposition 1.
Hypothesis Q In treatment SYM, the Walrasian quantity q w is the unique stochastically stable state according to the imitate the best max rule. However, in treatment ASYM, all monomorphic states ! q with 20 < q 40 are in the support of the limit invariant distribution and should be observed with strictly positive probability in the long run.
To obtain quantitative predictions about pro…ts in the short and medium run, we have conducted computer simulations that allow for realistic noise levels. The program followed with probability 1 " the imitation rule and chose actions with a uniform distribution from with probability ". In 10,000 repetitions of 60 periods, pro…ts were 35.2% higher on average in ASYM than in SYM for " = 0:2 and 37.8% higher for " = 0:1. 8 Hypothesis P Pro…ts in treatment ASYM are higher than in treatment SYM. Figure 2 shows relative frequencies of actions separately for our two treatments. The two histograms look remarkably similar and indeed, there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the two distributions according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at any conventional signi…cance level. The mode of both distributions is at 40, the Walrasian quantity, which is predicted by theory for SYM but not necessarily for ASYM. Table 1 shows average quantities and the percentage deviation of average pro…ts from the Cournot equilibrium pro…ts for the two treatments over all periods. 9 Pro…ts for treatment ASYM are calculated excluding the bonus of 50 for …rm 3. We …nd no signi…cant di¤erence between the distributions of average quantities according to MWU tests (see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan, 1988) on the basis of average quantities per group. Likewise, there is no signi…cant di¤erence with respect to the deviation from Cournot pro…ts. However, for both treatments we observe a sizable deviation from Cournot pro…ts towards the zero-pro…t predictions of the competitive equilibrium. This seems remarkable given the understandable resistance of subjects to remain near this zero-pro…t area.
Experimental results
We summarize our results as follows.
Result (1) Contrary to the theoretical prediction, there is no signi…cant di¤erence between our SYM and ASYM treatments in terms of quantities. In fact, in both treatments the mode of quantities is at the competitive quantity of 40.
(2) In both treatments there is a substantial deviation of pro…ts of around 40% from the Cournot equilibrium pro…t. We …nd no support for Hypothesis P, which predicts higher pro…ts in ASYM.
This leaves us with a puzzle to explain. Although data from treatment SYM are broadly consistent with theoretical predictions and simulations, data from treatment ASYM are not. To explain this, we would need a theory that predicts the same outcome (the Walrasian quantity of 40) in both treatments.
One possible candidate is relative payo¤ maximization. It is well known (see e.g. the survey by Alos-Ferrer and Schlag, 2007 ) that in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly, the long-run outcome of imitation corresponds to a …nite population ESS (Sha¤er, 1988 ) and the latter, in turn, is characterized by maximization of relative payo¤s. Interestingly, this correspondence between imitation and relative payo¤ maximization breaks down for asymmetric games.
A Nash equilibrium in a symmetric oligopoly in which players maximize relative payo¤s (or equivalently, a …nite ESS in the original game) q is given as q 2 arg max
One can easily check that given (1), the unique Nash equilibrium in the game where relative payo¤s are maximized is given by the Walrasian quantity q w . Obviously, adding or subtracting a constant to (5) does not change the maximizer. Hence …xed costs have no in ‡uence on the maximizer and consequently, the Nash equilibrium of the relative payo¤ game is at q w = 40 independent of the treatment, SYM or ASYM. Thus, one interpretation of our data would be that subjects try to maximize their relative payo¤s. But this topic certainly requires further study and experiments.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the fragility and robustness of the prediction in VegaRedondo's imitation theory (1997). If agents can observe their rivals and imitate the action that in the previous round was most successful, Walrasian outcomes emerge in the long run. However, as we show, this does no longer hold if there are di¤erences in costs, even if these di¤erences are very small. Intuitively, one would think that such a fragility would severely limit the theory's predictive power. But intuition is wrong. Despite its theoretical fragility, the link between information about rivals and intense competition is robust. Di¤erences in costs do not help subjects to overcome cut-throat competition. Whether this is due to imitation or to relative payo¤ maximization requires further study. But the result stresses the behavioral importance of information about rivals that orthodox game theory deems irrelevant.
course of the experiment. The number of points you may earn depends on your action and the actions of the two other participants in your group. At the end of the experiment your accumulated points will be converted to pound sterling at a rate of 200 : 1. Each round, you will have to choose one of 40 di¤erent actions, actions 1; 2; 3; : : : ; 40. Actions are ordered such that action 1 is the smallest and action 40 is the largest action. We are not going to tell you how your payo¤ is calculated, but in every round your payo¤ depends uniquely on your own decision and the decisions of the two other participants in your group. The rule underlying the calculation of the payo¤ does not depend on chance and remains the same in all 60 rounds.
After every round you get to know how many points you earned with your action in the current round. In addition, you will receive information about the actions of the other two participants in your group, and how many points each of them earned.
After the last period you will be reminded of all your 60 payo¤s and the computer will calculate the sum of these which will then be converted into pound sterling.
These are all the rules. Should you have any questions, please ask now. Otherwise have fun in the next 60 rounds.
